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Racial Integration as an Innovation: Empirical Evidence
from Sports Leagues
By BRIAN L. GOFF, ROBERT E. MCCORMICK,

AND

ROBERT D. TOLLISON*

This paper treats racial integration as an innovation in economic process in which
economic entities find it advantageous to utilize potentially more productive inputs
previously unavailable due to law, custom, or managerial discretion. Data on the
racial integration of Major League Baseball and Atlantic Coast Conference basketball are employed to address this issue. The central question examined is which
type of team integrated first—losers or winners? The results strongly support the
idea that entrepreneurship trumps competitive rivalry; that is, winning teams led the
process of racial integration. (JEL L1, J7)

One of the watershed events in U.S. history is
the struggle to achieve a racially integrated society. While the civil rights laws and court
rulings in the 1950’s, 1960’s, and 1970’s are
among the major changes in public policy that
gradually led to a breakdown of Jim Crow rule
in the American South, other changes in law
and custom also motivated the process of racial
integration across time and place. Indeed, segregation was not limited to the South but was
a prominent feature of many national organizations and markets. Despite the extensive
commentary on these events from various perspectives, there has been very little economic
analysis of the actual process of racial integration.1 Economists have focused their efforts on
the economics of discrimination while the actual process by which individuals, firms, and

other entities shifted from segregated to integrated states of operation has not been studied
carefully.2
In this paper we treat racial integration as an
innovation in economic process. Like other innovations, at some point in time firm and individuals find it advantageous to incorporate
additional and potentially more productive inputs previously unavailable due to law, custom,
or managerial discretion. With innovation, owners can potentially rearrange their operations in
a more profitable fashion. So the basic questions
are: what type of firm takes advantage of an
innovation early and why?
We address these questions in a study of the
racial integration of two U.S.-based sports: Major League Baseball (MLB) and Atlantic Coast
Conference (ACC) basketball. What type of
teams integrated first? There are two primary
hypotheses in this regard: worst-first and bestfirst. On the one hand, the worst teams might
have integrated first because they would have
had the most to gain from the recruitment of a
larger pool of talent that included black athletes.
This hypothesis begs the question of why these
same teams were not doing well in the segregated state of competition. On the other hand,
the best teams could have been the ones to
integrate first since they were better managed
and coached, and hence would have better understood the profit opportunities offered by in-

* Goff: Department of Economics, Western Kentucky
University, Bowling Green, KY 42101; McCormick: Department of Economics, Clemson University, Clemson, SC
29634; Tollison: Department of Economics, University of
Mississippi, University, MS 38677. We thank the Sports
Information office at Clemson (the late Bob Bradley, Jacob
Barker, Sam Blockman, and Tim Bourret), Mel Borland,
Richard Cantrell, Rodney Fort, Jeremy Loescher, Caleb
Michaud, Gerald Scully, William Shughart, Donna Tingle,
and especially two anonymous referees for helpful comments and assistance. Part of this research was conducted
while McCormick was Julian Simon Research Fellow at the
Political Economy Research Center (PERC). We also thank
PERC for partial financial support of this project. The usual
caveat applies. A copy of our data and unreported results is
available on request and at http://sixmile.clemson.edu.
1
See, however, Gavin Wright (1999).

2
See Glen G. Cain (1986) and Joseph G. Altonji and
Rebecca M. Blank (1999) for surveys of the former literature.
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tegration. Seeing the profit opportunity, they
were quicker to seize the moment. In other
words, a hypothesis based on competitive rivalry predicts a different empirical result than a
hypothesis based on managerial capability and
entrepreneurship.
Sports leagues present a setting for assessing
this question. First, we analyze data from 1947
to 1971 on the integration of baseball, starting
in 1947 with Jackie Robinson of the Brooklyn
Dodgers and Larry Doby of the Cleveland Indians.3 This initial integration expanded
through the 1950’s, when the Boston Red Sox
in 1959 were the last organization to field an
all-white team, and then through the 1960’s as
the use of black players became commonplace
in baseball.
Second, we examine the experience of the
ACC in college basketball where the first black
player in the league was Billy Jones at the
University of Maryland in the 1965–1966 season. This was nine years after Jackie Robinson
retired from baseball, and the same year that
Texas Western University won the National
Collegiate Athletic Association basketball
championship with an all-black starting lineup
(beating an all-white Kentucky team). After the
1965–1966 season, additional black players
were recruited by ACC schools that gradually
desegregated the teams at ACC schools in a
process that took nearly 20 years.
These data allow us to examine the process of
racial integration in different settings with overlapping but different time frames. The baseball
data provide information from a for-profit environment where firms were geographically dispersed among large urban areas primarily in the
North, Midwest, and West. The basketball data
provide information from a not-for-profit environment where the firms operated in primarily
Jim Crow states and were dispersed across both
urban areas (College Park, Maryland) and small
cities (Clemson, South Carolina).

FIGURE 1. PERCENTAGE OF BLACK PLAYERS
TEAMS, 1947–1971
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Note: Left-hand side is in percentages.

ses of Zvi Griliches (1957) and Edward
Mansfield (1968). They showed how innovation
tends to be diffused in the form of a logistic
function where the new resource or technology
is first adopted at an increasing rate by actors in
the economy and then exhibits diminishing returns and an end point at a partial or full diffusion. The form of these logistic functions implies
that the most profitable uses of the innovation are
deployed first and that competition among users
facilitates this result. Hybrid corn took hold in
Illinois and Iowa on the most fertile corn land and
spread out from there towards the low-rent margin
in less fertile growing areas, or in our terminology,
the best farms(ers) innovated first.
The process of racial integration in baseball
and basketball followed this same general pattern. Figure 1 depicts the process of integration
in baseball showing the median, maximum, and
minimum ratios of black players for
1947–1971.4 The figure indicates that the diffusion of black athletes followed the typical logistic shape and that by the mid-1960’s the
median ratio leveled off. However, there were
considerable differences across teams in the

I. Innovation and Integration

Some of the earliest contributions to the economics of innovation were the empirical analy-

3
Latin players participated in Major League Baseball
from 1900 forward; see Peter C. Bjorkman (1994).

4
This ratio is the number of black players on a team’s
roster during a given year divided by a roster size of 25.
Data are available only on a sporadic basis for years after
1971. The mean percentage of black players is 30 percent in
1975, 27 percent in 1980, and 25 percent in 1985. These
additional years are from Gerald Scully (1974) and Jules
Tygiel (1997).
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FIGURE 2. THE PACE

OF INTEGRATION IN

MARCH 2002

ATLANTIC COAST CONFERENCE MEN’S BASKETBALL

Note: Left-hand side is in percentages.

speed of adaptation to racial integration. The
teams that used black players most intensively
early on, such as the Brooklyn/Los Angeles
Dodgers and New York/San Francisco Giants,
reach near-maximum levels before some teams,
such as the Detroit Tigers and Boston Red Sox,
ever began to use any black players. Into the
late 1960’s and early 1970’s, large disparities
existed between the ratios of teams at the maximum (about 40-percent black players) and
minimum (about 10-percent) levels.
Figure 2 depicts the path of racial integration
in ACC basketball. The minimum and maximum percentages are the envelopes of all teams
in the league. While the pace across schools was
quite similar, the cross-sectional levels are distinctly different. Table 1 lists the team-average
and league-average black player to total team
ratios by decade. The asterisk rows are statistically significant. In all three decades Duke is
below the mean. Clemson, Maryland, and North
Carolina State are above the mean more than the
rest of the teams. The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill is below the mean in the 1990’s
(the 1989 –1990 through 1991–1992 seasons in
these data). Again, the process of racial integration in basketball followed a logistic-type
pattern quite similar to innovations in general.
The first issue we address is the relative im-

portance of competitive rivalry as an incentive
to innovate versus the alternative managerial
alertness hypothesis. The external incentive hypothesis predicts that poorer performing teams
will innovate earlier so that past success will be
inversely related to the early use of black players. The farther a team is back in league standings, the more likely it is to be a leader in
integration. Alternatively, the managerial alertness hypothesis predicts that past excellence in
performance depends on managerial skills, so
that past success will be positively related to the
earlier use of black players.5 According to this
view, teams with the best winning records and
better management are more likely to be leaders
in the integration process.6

5
Note that the managerial hypothesis encompasses more
dimensions than have been investigated in studies of the
“technical efficiency” of sports managers. See Robert C.
Clement and McCormick (1989) and John Ruggiero et al.
(1996) for examples of this kind of work.
6
The competitive advantage of using black baseball
players was apparent to contemporary observers. Chester
Washington of the Pittsburgh Courier sent a telegram in
1937 to the manager of the Pirates: “Know your club needs
players. Have answers to your prayers right here in Pittsburgh. Josh Gibson catcher Buck Leonard first base S. Paige
pitcher and Cool Papa Bell all available at reasonable figures. Would make Pirates formidable Pennant contenders”
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TABLE 1—TEAM

School
Clemson
Clemson
Clemson
Duke
Duke
Duke
Georgia Tech
Georgia Tech
Maryland
Maryland
Maryland
NC State
NC State
NC State
North Carolina
North Carolina
North Carolina
South Carolina
Virginia
Virginia
Virginia
Wake Forest
Wake Forest
Wake Forest

AND

LEAGUE AVERAGES

OF

BLACK PLAYERS

BY
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DECADE

Decade

Average Black to
Total Ratio

Number of
Observations

League
Average

League
STD

t-test

70
80
90
70
80
90
80
90
70
80
90
70
80
90
70
80
90
70
70
80
90
70
80
90

27.8
63.7
78.8
15.8
39.2
43.4
60.2
55.9
44.4
59.8
72.1
32.9
67.9
65.5
27.6
49.2
49.1
4.2
19.9
54.1
54.6
41.7
51.7
61.7

10
10
3
10
10
3
10
3
10
10
3
10
10
3
10
10
3
2
10
10
3
10
10
3

29.3
55.7
60.1
29.3
55.7
60.1
55.7
60.1
29.3
55.7
60.1
29.3
55.7
60.1
29.3
55.7
60.1
29.3
29.3
55.7
60.1
29.3
55.7
60.1

18.8
15.8
14.3
18.8
15.8
14.3
15.8
14.3
18.8
15.8
14.3
18.8
15.8
14.3
18.8
15.8
14.3
18.8
18.8
15.8
14.3
18.8
15.8
14.3

⫺0.255
1.595
4.140*
⫺2.271*
⫺3.316*
⫺3.710*
0.899
⫺0.929
2.541*
0.817
2.644*
0.608
2.442*
1.177
⫺0.288
⫺1.303
⫺2.452*
⫺4.234*
⫺1.581
⫺0.326
⫺1.216
2.092*
⫺0.808
0.345

Notes: Average Black to Total Ratio, League Average, and League STD columns are percentages. Asterisks denote statistical
significance.
Source: See footnote 12.

There is a second issue concerning the process of integration. Essentially, Ricardian
logic suggests that the first black athletes in
baseball and basketball should have been

(Geoffrey Ward and Ken Burns, 1994 p. 247). Dizzy Dean
said of Satchel Paige in the mid-1930’s that he was “... the
best pitcher I ever saw” (Tygiel, 1983 p. 27).
As for the entrepreneurial hypothesis, the evidence is
mixed. Not all baseball people shared an enthusiastic view
of the capabilities of black players. In 1947, Bobby Feller,
a star pitcher for the Cleveland Indians, who had played
many barnstorming games against black players, thought
that of the players he had seen, only Satchel Paige and Josh
Gibson might qualify for the Majors. Of Jackie Robinson,
Feller said he “could not foresee any future ... in big league
baseball” (Tygiel, 1983 p. 76). Ironically, Feller and Robinson were later elected to the Baseball Hall of Fame in the
same year (1962). In addition to evaluating black player
skills, entrepreneurship in bringing blacks to the Majors
also involved political skills by MLB general managers. For
example, Branch Rickey’s plan to bring Jackie Robinson to
the Brooklyn Dodgers was so veiled that another black
player whom Rickey had approached, Roy Campanella,
thought the overture to Robinson related to the Negro
League’s Brooklyn Brown Dodgers (Tygiel, 1983 p. 77).

comparatively more productive relative to
their white counterparts than their later arriving black teammates. We expect this productivity difference to show up in performance
statistics. An integrated equilibrium will be
reached where the marginal black and white
players on each team possess comparable
abilities, that is, have equal marginal revenue
products.7 We expect to observe such productivity differences and patterns in the data on
baseball and basketball players. Once racial
integration is complete, there should not be
any residual performance differences associated with skin color.
7
The marginal revenue products of athletes as entertainers are determined by various output prices (tickets, merchandise, media rights) and the marginal product of players.
Players produce relevant outputs such as attendance both by
helping teams win and by entertaining fans with performances not perfectly correlated with winning. The 1998
home run record chase by Mark McGuire and Sammy Sosa
stands as an example; Dennis Rodman’s off-court antics
another?
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II. Data Analysis: Integration
in Major League Baseball

The general framework for our empirical
model of baseball is:
BLACKit ⫽ ␣t ⫹ x it ␤ ⫹ e it ,

(1)

where BLACKit ⫽ number of black players on
team i in year t. The model includes year as a
fixed-effect vector, ␣t , to account for changes
over time in the legal and social framework that
would have impacted on the incentive of baseball management to use black players. Over the
time frame, 1947–1971, several landmark court
and legislative changes were made which influenced the political environment in which managerial choices were made, such as the 1964
Civil Rights Law. Beyond particular laws the
1950’s and 1960’s were a time of sweeping
change with regard to the broader integration of
African-Americans into society at large. Including the time variable allows the effect of these
events on the pace of integration to be estimated. We expect the effect of time to be negative at the outset and to move toward zero over
the time period.
The values for x measure variables across
each team and over time that are related to
management’s perception of the marginal revenue product from using additional black athletes. Equation (2) presents the specific set of
variables we have chosen to include in x:
(2)

BLACKit
⫽ ␣t ⫹ ␤ 0 ⫹ ␤ 1 Games Backit⫺1 ,
⫹␤ 2 Median Family Incomeit
⫹ ␤ 3 Percentage Nonwhiteit ⫹ e it ,

where
Games Backit⫺1 ⫽ number of games
out of first place
by team i in year
t ⫺ 1;
Median Family Incomeit ⫽ median family
income (in 1950
dollars) for team i
in year t; and

MARCH 2002

Percentage Nonwhiteit ⫽ percentage of
population that is
nonwhite in year t
for teami .
Games Back is a measure of relative team
performance such that ␤1 ⬎ 0 if the worst teams
integrated first and ␤1 ⬍ 0 if the best teams
integrated first. Beyond the fact that it is the
most common means of tracking performance
for teams trying to win division titles and pennants, Games Back offers an advantage over
other measures of team performance in baseball, such as winning percentage. Winning percentages, though correlated with relative
performance, do not measure relative performance as accurately as Games Back because
MLB teams are split into two leagues over the
entire time frame and into two divisions within
each league for 1969 –1971.
Since no direct measures of customer willingness to pay to see black versus white players
exist, we include Median Family Income and
Percentage Nonwhite as possible indicators of
differences in customer discrimination across
teams and over time. The rationale for Median
Family Income is the common association of
higher levels of discrimination with lower levels of income. If customer discrimination is
negatively associated with real income, then
␤2 ⬎ 0. Percentage Nonwhite accounts for the
possibility that a larger Percentage Nonwhite
population (reflecting mostly African-Americans
at this time for the cities in our sample) may
have a marginal preference for black players;
hence ␤3 ⬎ 0. Some historical accounts attribute the early use of black players by the
Brooklyn Dodgers to such a local influence.8

8
The number of black players per team for 1947–1959
was derived from performance records of black players
from this time period presented in Larry Moffi and Jonathan
Kronstadt (1994). For 1960 –1971, we rely upon Scully
(1974 pp. 234 –35). Scully’s data list the percentage of black
players, which we convert to number of black players by
multiplying by the typical roster size of 25. Games back
data are from John Thorn et al. (1997). Demographic and
income data are from U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, City County Data Book (various issues).
MFI annual values between Census years are linear interpolations. For Percentage Nonwhite, Census-year data are
used until the midpoint of a decade, and then data from the
next Census are used.
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TABLE 2—ESTIMATES

OF

MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL INTEGRATION, 1947–1971

Variable

Coefficient/t-ratio

Intercept
Games Back
Median Family Income
Percentage Nonwhite
Year Effects

R2
F-statistic

21

1947 ⫽ ⫺5.88
(⫺7.74)*
1950 ⫽ ⫺5.67
(⫺7.78)*
1953 ⫽ ⫺4.70
(⫺6.73)*
1956 ⫽ ⫺2.08
(⫺4.19)*
1959 ⫽ ⫺2.05
(⫺3.20)*
1962 ⫽ ⫺1.69
(⫺2.80)*
1965 ⫽ ⫺0.68
(⫺1.18)
1968 ⫽ 0.26
(0.45)
0.58
21.10

1948 ⫽ ⫺6.08
(⫺8.12)*
1951 ⫽ ⫺5.09
(⫺7.10)*
1954 ⫽ ⫺3.58
(⫺5.18)*
1957 ⫽ ⫺2.66
(⫺4.02)*
1960 ⫽ ⫺2.34
(⫺3.79)*
1963 ⫽ ⫺1.19
(⫺2.03)*
1966 ⫽ ⫺0.05
(⫺0.04)
1969 ⫽ 0.84
(1.47)

1949 ⫽ ⫺5.79
(⫺7.85)*
1952 ⫽ ⫺4.85
(⫺6.09)*
1955 ⫽ ⫺3.06
(⫺4.50)*
1958 ⫽ ⫺2.19
(⫺3.38)*
1961 ⫽ ⫺1.90
(⫺3.00)*
1964 ⫽ ⫺1.23
(⫺2.11)*
1967 ⫽ ⫺0.24
(⫺0.40)
1970 ⫽ 0.59
(1.08)

7.49
(7.96)
⫺0.03
(⫺4.64)*
⫺0.16
(⫺1.32)
⫺0.01
(⫺0.32)

Source: See footnote 8.
* Significant at the 0.05 level or lower.

Table 2 reports the estimated ordinary leastsquares coefficients for equation (2) for 1947–
1971. Overall, the equation explains about 58
percent of the variation in the number of black
players on each team. The estimated coefficient
for Games Back is negative and significant (at
better than the 1-percent level). The coefficients
on Median Family Income and Percentage Nonwhite are not significant. The year coefficients
are negative and significant at better than the
5-percent level from 1947 through 1964. After
1964, the coefficients are not significantly different from zero. The largest increases in the
year coefficients occur between 1953–1954
(1.1), 1965–1966 (0.7), 1950 –1951 (0.6),
1962–1963 (0.5), and 1964 –1965 (0.5).
The negative and significant coefficient on
Games Back is insensitive to several alternative
empirical methods and specifications. These include: estimating equation (2) by treating
Games Back as endogenous and using predicted
values for lagged games back; including a
dummy variable for southern cities; including

city-based fixed effects; narrowing the time
frame; and eliminating the insignificant independent variables. In these alternative specifications the coefficients on Games Back range
from ⫺0.03 to ⫺0.07 and are significant at or
below the 1-percent level.9
In addition to these variations, we also
substituted lagged winning percentage for
games back along with fixed effects for year.
9
In the two-stage least-squares (2SLS) version we estimated predicted values for Games Back with the prior two
years’ games back, a city-based fixed effect, and the number
of black players as the instruments. The first stage has an R 2
of 0.45, and all the independent variable coefficients are
statistically significant at or below the 5-percent level. The
2SLS estimated coefficient for Games Back, using both year
and city effects, is ⫺0.07 (t ⫽ 5.41), and the R 2 is 0.57.
The only significant city effects are for Atlanta and Houston
(both positive). With southern cities included, Games Back
is ⫺0.039 (t ⫽ 4.54); Games Back is ⫺0.03 (t ⫽ 2.97)
for the shorter time period, 1947–1959; and excluding insignificant regressors, Games Back is ⫺0.03 (t ⫽ 4.90).
Other than year effects, the other variables in the 2SLS
versions are insignificant.
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Although Games Back is a more precise measure of relative performance in baseball, it is
highly correlated with winning percentage.
The overall explanatory value of the equation
is nearly identical (0.57), and the coefficient
on lagged winning percentage is positive
(4.6) and significant at the 1-percent level—
winning teams integrated earlier. The effect is
similar in magnitude to using Games Back.
One game back is equal to about a 0.006
reduction in winning percentage.
Within Major League Baseball the experiences of the National League (NL) and American League (AL) differed considerably. The
NL had nearly achieved a steady level of
black players by 1960, with a league average
of 22-percent black players and no team having fewer than 16 percent of its roster made
up of black players. In contrast, no AL team
had more than 16 percent of black players in
1960. AL teams had 9-percent black players
on average, and this figure did not rise above
20 percent until 1968. Moreover, the magnitude of the effect of lagged games back in the
regression equation is influenced by AL
teams, but not the sign or significance. For
example, dropping all of the AL teams increases the magnitude of the coefficient
slightly from ⫺0.03 to over ⫺0.04, while the
coefficient for the AL only sample is ⫺0.02.
An AL dummy variable indicates, on average,
that AL teams used about 1.7 fewer black
players each year than their NL counterparts.
This finding suggests that competition in the
NL, led by the Brooklyn Dodgers, forced
other NL teams to integrate rapidly or lose,
while absent Branch Rickey in the AL, the
overall pace of integration was slower.
III. Data Analysis: Integration in Atlantic Coast
Conference Basketball

Consider now the model of racial discrimination in the context of college basketball.
Discrimination limits the pool of talent.
Those that first tap the expanded pool of
talent will be more successful. The willingness to integrate is also a function of the local
environment. We express this model formally
as:
(3)

B ⫽ ␤ 0 ⫹ ␤ 1 W ⫹ ␤ 2 D,

MARCH 2002

where W is the overall team winning percentage in a given year; B is the fraction of the
players on the team who are black; and D is a
vector of local demographic characteristics,
respectively.
During the period of innovation or diffusion,
if the first-best hypothesis is correct, ␤1 ⬎ 0. If
the worst teams integrate first, this coefficient
will be negative. The null is, of course, no
relation between winning and team integration.10 We estimated the parameters of this
model using annual data for each team in the
ACC during the period 1961 through 1984 by
the technique of ordinary least squares.11 The
results of several different specifications are
reported in Table 3.12 The winning percentages
are lagged one year. That is, we inquire whether
games won or lost last year affects racial composition in the subsequent season.
The results are robust with respect to the
best-first hypothesis. The winning percentage
variable is strongly positive in all specifications.
Overall team-winning percentage is a strong
predictor of which schools integrated first. Income, black, and rural population appear to

10
The relation between blacks and winning should eventually dissipate when innovation or diffusion is complete.
Hence, the test of the parameter, ␤1 , is only conducted over
the period of diffusion. As shown earlier, this is approximately 1961–1984. See Figure 2.
11
The results we report below are not sensitive to the
exact period chosen. Similar results obtain if we add or
delete years on the front end, or delete years on the back
end. We do not think it is appropriate to add years past the
point of full diffusion on the back end.
12
It has been suggested that we use more local values for
demographic information. While this is possible, we think
the state data are more appropriate as most of these schools
are state schools, and the politics of integration and related
issues were, in our opinion, more clearly determined by
overall state politics.
Also, the University of South Carolina was a member of
the ACC until 1972. They are excluded from the estimation
process here. Including the University of South Carolina
does not alter the results.
Data on black players were collected by examining team
photographs year by year, provided by the Atlantic Coast
Conference offices in Greensboro, North Carolina. Black
population, rural population, and per capita income are from
U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census,
Statistical Abstract of the United States (various years).
Winning percentage and attendance are from the Atlantic
Coast Conference Fact Book (various years). Female/male
ratio is from Clemson University Men’s Basketball Guide
(various years).
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TABLE 3—ORDINARY LEAST-SQUARES ESTIMATES OF THE BASKETBALL INTEGRATION EQUATION
(DEPENDENT VARIABLE: RATIO OF BLACKS TO NUMBER OF PLAYERS ON TEAM, ANNUALLY,
1961–1984 IN ACC)
Coefficient/t-ratioa

Variable

0.0411 ⫺0.05639
(⫺0.76)
(⫺9.12)
0.3561
0.179
(4.07)
(2.74)
0.000093
(12.69)

Intercept
Overall team annual winning percentage lagged one year
State real income per capita where school located
Percentage of population rural in state where school located

⫺0.5541
(⫺6.18)
0.1826
(2.63)
0.000092
(10.47)
⫺0.013
(⫺0.15)

⫺0.7791
(⫺7.51)
0.1966
(2.94)
0.000085
(9.84)
⫺0.466
(⫺3.26)
2.0334
(3.90)

⫺0.7791
(⫺7.49)
0.1953
(2.80)
0.000085
(8.64)
⫺0.4665
(⫺3.25)
2.0392
(3.85)
⫺0.0037
(⫺0.07)

0.5166
63.76
183

0.5546
55.4
183

0.5546
44.07
183

Black percentage of state population in state where school located
Ratio of females to males at school

R2
F-statistic
Number of observations in regression

0.0839
16.58
183

0.5165
96.15
183

Note: Teams: Clemson, Duke, Maryland, NC State, UNC-Chapel Hill, Virginia, Wake Forest. See footnote 12.
a
t-ratios listed in parentheses under coefficient estimate.

impact the process of integration in a predictable fashion, while university-specific gender
ratios are unrelated to the integration process.
The latter result suggests that segregation was
not a male-driven phenomenon. The model explains about 50 percent of the variation in the
process of racial integration, depending on
specification.
Numerous other specifications were estimated, including versions that controlled for
stadium size, private versus public institutions,
and other variables.13 These other variables do
not appear to matter in the process of integration, nor did they alter the results on the model
of winning percentages.14
The results in Table 3 say that good teams
were first to adopt the new innovation, that is, to
integrate. The managerial alertness hypothesis
is supported with these data, and we conclude

that, as before in the case of baseball, good
managers are the first adopters of new, improved technology.

We have assembled evidence to investigate
the proposition that the first black players were
more productive relative to their white counterparts and that this productivity advantage tapered off over time, so that after diffusion and
innovation marginal players, black or white,
were of the same talent.
We first computed slugging averages for
black and white players at three-year intervals
from 1948 to 1999, and then computed quartiles
for each group.15 Slugging average is a commonly used summary measure of offensive

13
We also estimated the integration equation simultaneously with a winning equation where games won and
black players are endogenous. The results are comparable to
the ones we report in Table 3.
14
We also regressed the year that teams incorporated
their first black player on overall team winning percentages
in the 1960’s and average state real income per capita
during the 1960’s. There is a strong negative and significant
relationship between winning and year of the first black
player in this regression, a result supporting the evidence
reported in Table 3.

15
This data set was constructed using player performance data in The Baseball Archive Baseball Database at
www.baseball.com. Assignment of race was done using
Moffi and Kronstadt (1994), as well as the authors’ knowledge augmented by that of several colleagues. We included
players who appeared in at least 120 games (approximately
75 percent) in a given year. This excludes players who were
injured for substantial periods as well as less-known, parttime players with limited at bats for whom racial classification was difficult.

IV. Productivity Results:
Major League Baseball
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FIGURE 3. MEDIAN SLUGGING PERCENTAGES OF BLACK AND
WHITE MLB PLAYERS AT THREE-YEAR INTERVALS,
1948 –1998
Notes: Black players include black Latinos. White players
include Hispanic Latinos. See footnote 16. Left-hand side is
in percentages.

production. It is computed by dividing total
bases by total plate appearances (at bats, bases
on balls, sacrifices).
Figure 3 displays the median slugging averages for black and white players at three-year
intervals, and Figure 4 displays the 25th and
75th percentiles.16 At the median black players’
slugging averages ranged from 4 to 8 percentage points higher than those for white players
throughout the 1950’s and 1960’s. The averages
began to converge during the 1970’s and differed by only small amounts throughout the
1980’s and 1990’s. The results for the 75th
percentiles are similar to the median results.
The 25th percentiles exhibit smaller differences
after the mid-1950’s, even converging for a
brief period during the late 1950’s.17

16
Blacks in the sample include blacks from Latin America, and whites include Hispanics from Latin America. As is
always the case, designation of race by external observers
based on subtle differences in skin color can be arbitrary.
We estimated but do not report results for only AfricanAmericans and whites born in the United States. These
results are nearly identical to those including Latin American players.
17
We also estimated regressions of the number of black
players on team winning percentage for three-year rolling
intervals, starting with 1947–1949 and continuing until
1971. The coefficient values reach a maximum for 1948 –
1950, and then decline. The median coefficient value for
1947–1959 is 0.016 while for 1960 –1971 the median value

MARCH 2002

FIGURE 4. 75TH AND 25TH PERCENTILES FOR SLUGGING
PERCENTAGES OF BLACK AND WHITE MLB PLAYERS AT
THREE-YEAR INTERVALS, 1948 –1998
Note: See Figure 3.

Awards in baseball such as Most Valuable
Player and Rookie of the Year indicate similar
kinds of productivity differences at the high end
of player performance. These awards are summarized by decade and race in Table 4. For
instance, starting with Jackie Robinson in 1947,
black players won six of the next seven Rookie
of the Year awards. Dominance of black players
in winning these awards began to subside in the
1960’s with the AL significantly lagging behind
the NL in its recognition of black talent.
V. Productivity Results: Atlantic Coast
Conference Basketball

The productivity hypothesis says that black
players will perform better relative to white players during the period of innovation/diffusion than
during the post-diffusion era. To examine this
question in basketball we estimated the relation
between games won and black percentage of
team, providing separate estimates of the relation
between black proportion on the team and winning for each year during the innovation era.18
Table 5 reports these individual estimates,
is 0.007. For a similar approach with the same results, see
Andrew Hanssen (1998).
18
We also controlled for team talent using coaching
experience, shooting percentages, and rebounding, and estimated this equation simultaneously using two-stage least
squares.
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TABLE 4—AWARDS TO BLACK MAJOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL PLAYERS
Rookie of
the Year

MVP
1950–1959
1960–1969
1970–1979
1980–1989
1990–1999
a

NL
8/10
6/10
4.5/10
3/10
6/10

AL
0/10
2/10
6/10
1/10
5/10

NL
9/13*
2/10
3/10
3/10
1/10

AL
0/13a
2/10
3/10
3/10
1/10

Data for 1947–1959.

TABLE 5—YEARLY ESTIMATES OF THE RELATION BETWEEN
BLACK PROPORTION OF TOTAL TEAM AND WINNING
(DEPENDENT VARIABLE: ANNUAL TEAM OVERALL WINNING
PERCENTAGE, 1961–1984, ACC SCHOOLS,
EXCLUDING SOUTH CAROLINA)

Year

Coefficient Estimate
on Black
Proportion of
Probability
Total Team
t-ratio
兩t兩 ⬎ 0

Pooled estimate
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983

0.2176
⫺0.724
⫺0.453
0.588
0.599
0.360
0.613
0.466
0.469
0.251
0.294
0.224
0.198
0.151
0.277
0.300
0.322
0.165
0.196

3.61
⫺0.740
⫺0.640
1.130
1.370
1.030
1.930
1.840
2.200
1.600
2.150
1.640
1.470
1.110
1.910
2.190
2.260
1.350
1.670

0.0004
0.463
0.524
0.260
0.173
0.302
0.055
0.068
0.029
0.111
0.034
0.103
0.144
0.269
0.058
0.030
0.025
0.178
0.096

Source: See Table 3.

and they are plotted in Figure 5. The estimates
are consistent with the Jackie Robinson hypothesis. During the period of innovation, the impact
of additional black players on winning was bigger and more significant than during the postdiffusion period. Note that the relation is not
significant in the first year that Maryland integrated, but is significant in subsequent years,
and, moreover, that the relation declines in
value as the innovation diffuses into the league.
We also estimated the parameters of the inte-

FIGURE 5. RELATION BETWEEN WINNING AND BLACK
PERCENTAGE OF TOTAL TEAM SIZE OVER TIME

gration and winning equations for the postdiffusion era only, that is, for 1985 forward. The
parameter on black percentage in the winning
equation is not significant in this case in contrast
to the diffusion period.19
VI. Concluding Remarks

Racial integration spread across professional
baseball teams and the basketball schools along
Tobacco Road in a fashion similar to other
innovations in economic process. Previously
successful entrepreneurs figured out how to obtain black athletic talent and to use it to their

19
We also addressed the issue of the relative productivity of black to white players in the ACC in other ways. We
assembled data (Ron Morris, 1988) on the black/white ratio
of the All-Atlantic Coast Conference Team and compared it
to the black/total players ratio leaguewide. The data are
from 1965–1992, several years beyond the point at which an
integrated equilibrium had been reached in the Conference.
This analysis reveals that in the ACC there is a greater
fraction of black players who are all-stars than there are
black players represented on their teams.
Also, looking at individual performance data, such as
points scored, we find that the black players score more and
rebound more than their white counterparts. We decomposed these individual player performance statistics by decade from 1960 through the early 1990’s, and we find that
it persists. Black basketball players are better than their
white counterparts, but they are disproportionately underrepresented on their teams. The persistence of a difference
on average, by race, calls for further analysis. We are
working on answering the question of whether this is due to
lingering discrimination or simply to the fact that, at the
margin, the quality of play is the same across race but not on
average.
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teams’ advantage, that is, to continue to win and
to garner additional revenues and recognition.
The process of integration took about 20 to 25
years to complete in both sports, that is, to move
from a segregated to an integrated equilibrium.
The degree of competition in college basketball
and baseball may have had something to do
with the relative speed of adjustment; without
comparable examples from other venues, we
cannot say whether 20 to 25 years is a long time
or not. However, this length of time corresponds
roughly to the turnover of nearly all of the
managers and owners from the segregated era.
Once the coaches and managers in these leagues
were drawn from individuals who had played
during the integrated era, the process of integration reached its fruition.
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